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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal by Karla Knabe arises from her civil action 
against Boury Corporation alleging that she was a victim of 
unlawful sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. C.S. § 951 et 
seq., while she was employed as a waitress at Boury's 
"Elby's Big Boy" restaurant in Monroeville, Pennsylvania. 
Knabe contends that she was subjected to a hostile work 
environment created by Kevin Humbrecht, one of the 
restaurant managers. The district court, having concluded 
that Boury was not liable as a matter of law for 
Humbrecht's actions because it took prompt and adequate 
remedial action after Knabe reported the harassment to 
company officials, as required by Bouton v. BMW of North 
America, Inc., 29 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 1994), granted summary 
judgment to Boury. Although we view the facts in the light 
most favorable to Knabe, the non-moving party, because we 
conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact that 
the actions taken by Boury in response to Knabe's 
complaint were other than "reasonably calculated" to 
prevent future acts of harassment, we affirm.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Knabe makes two other contentions on appeal, both of which we reject 
summarily. First, Knabe contends that the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment without addressing her"retaliation" claim. 
Knabe's complaint, however, fails to plead a retaliation count. Second, 
Knabe contends that the district court erred in rejecting her constructive 
discharge claim. We disagree. Knabe's constructive discharge claim, as 
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I. 
 
Knabe began working as a waitress at the Elby's Big Boy 
restaurant on August 6, 1993. According to her affidavit 
and deposition testimony, over the course of the following 
two months, Humbrecht engaged in several acts of sexual 
harassment. On at least a dozen occasions, he bumped into 
her from behind, rubbed himself against her, or ran his 
hands over her buttocks at the pie cooler or in other 
behind-the-counter spaces. On one occasion in September 
1993, Knabe showed Humbrecht a broken light in the 
women's restroom. Several male employees were standing 
just outside, and as Humbrecht and Knabe exited, 
Humbrecht pretended to pull up his pants and his zipper in 
the presence of the other employees. Knabe testified that, 
when she expressed her displeasure after each of these 
incidents, Humbrecht responded "don't take it personal." 
 
On September 5, 1993, Knabe fell in the waitress area, 
causing her skirt to come up and exposing most of her legs 
and lower body. Sometime after her fall, Humbrecht asked 
her whether she had been wearing underwear when she 
fell. And on October 13, 1993, Humbrecht called Knabe at 
home at approximately 7:50 a.m. to ask her to come into 
work early. She told him she would be in after she had 
showered and had a cup of coffee. Later that day, 
Humbrecht asked her whether she had been having sex 
with her fiance when he called that morning. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
presented here, is not a separate ground for relief, but rather would 
factor into the damages (e.g., backpay) available to Knabe had she 
prevailed in proving Boury's liability for sexual harassment. At all events, 
Knabe has not presented evidence sufficient to sustain a constructive 
discharge claim under Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d 885, 
887-88 (3d Cir. 1984), where we held that a plaintiff has been 
constructively discharged if "the conduct complained of would have the 
foreseeable result that working conditions would be so unpleasant or 
difficult that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would resign." 
Id.; see also Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1079 (3d Cir. 
1992). As we conclude that Knabe has not adduced evidence that the 
remedial action chosen by Boury was lacking, we think it is clear that 
Knabe could not meet this test. 
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After Knabe had threatened to report his conduct to his 
supervisor, Humbrecht removed her from the work schedule.2 
Knabe testified that, throughout her employment, whenever 
she had threatened to report him, Humbrecht told her that 
"life in the unemployment line" was very unpleasant. Knabe 
has acknowledged that, except for the restroom episode, 
there were no witnesses to any of Humbrecht's actions. 
 
On October 20, 1993, Knabe complained by telephone to 
Sharon Barnes, who supervised the Monroeville restaurant 
as well as four other Elby's. Knabe reported the instances 
of harassment described above, as well as the fact that she 
had been taken off the work schedule when she threatened 
to report Humbrecht.3 This was the first indication to Elby's 
management about Humbrecht's conduct. Barnes 
consulted Elby's procedures for investigating a sexual 
harassment complaint, and also contacted the director of 
Big Boy East and Elby's legal counsel for advice about 
investigation procedure. 
 
On October 21, 1993, Barnes interviewed Humbrecht. He 
denied any improper comments to Knabe on October 13, 
1993, and Barnes did not ask him about the other 
incidents. Barnes, along with Elby's director of operations, 
met with Knabe on October 23, 1993, and Knabe informed 
them that she wanted Humbrecht to be discharged or 
transferred to another restaurant. Barnes then interviewed 
three of Knabe's co-workers, all of whom had worked on 
Knabe's shift on October 13, 1993. Each reported to Barnes 
that they had not witnessed Humbrecht make any improper 
statements to Knabe, and that they had never observed any 
inappropriate behavior by a manager in the restaurant. 
 
At the conclusion of her investigation, Barnes decided not 
to reprimand or otherwise sanction Humbrecht, based on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Boury's version is that Knabe was removed from the schedule as a 
disciplinary measure for writing a rude note to Randy Gilbert, the 
manager responsible for scheduling, and for telling Humbrecht how to 
run the restaurant. 
 
3. In her affidavit, Knabe stated that, when she reported the harassment, 
Barnes said that she "thought Kevin had learned his lesson." Barnes 
explained in her declaration that Humbrecht had been transferred to the 
Monroeville Elby's because he had engaged in a consensual affair with a 
female subordinate at another Elby's. 
 
                                4 
her (mistaken) belief that she could not make afinding that 
an employee had engaged in sexual harassment without 
corroborating testimony. However, she met with Humbrecht 
and informed him that Knabe was to be returned to the 
work schedule immediately. More importantly, Barnes 
reminded him that the "company does not tolerate any 
sexual comments or actions" and that any "company 
violations of this policy will receive possible suspension and 
or termination." Both Barnes and Humbrecht signed a 
"record of conversation" acknowledging the substance of the 
conversation. Humbrecht also acknowledged that the 
"procedures were explained to me and I do understand 
them. I will continue to adhere to them." 
 
The next day, October 26, Barnes met with Knabe. She 
informed Knabe that, because there were no witnesses to 
Humbrecht's conduct, she could not conclude that 
Humbrecht had done anything inappropriate and, hence, 
she could not reprimand Humbrecht. Barnes also told 
Knabe that she had been restored to the work schedule, 
and that she should call Barnes or certain other members 
of Elby's management if the conduct recurred. Knabe 
responded by informing Barnes that she could not return to 
work because Humbrecht had not been transferred or fired, 
and that she would pursue her recently filed EEOC charge. 
Both Barnes and Knabe signed the record of conversation 
reporting the substance of the conversation. 
 
Boury's papers represent that, at all times during the 
period in question, the company's sexual harassment and 
open door policies were posted on the Communications 
Board at the restaurant along with the names and phone 
numbers of company managers to contact to lodge a 
complaint. Moreover, the open door policy appeared in the 
employee handbook. Knabe, however, testified that she 
never saw these policies during her employment at the 
restaurant. 
 
In September 1994, Knabe filed a complaint in the 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, 
alleging that she was a victim of unlawful harassment in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act, 43 Pa. C.S. § 951 et seq. After discovery, 
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Boury moved for summary judgment. The magistrate judge 
to whom the case was referred filed a report concluding 
that, while there was a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether Knabe was subjected to a hostile work 
environment, Boury could not be held liable as a matter of 
law for Humbrecht's actions because it took prompt and 
effective remedial action after learning of Humbrecht's 
conduct, as required under Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 
895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990), and Bouton v. BMW of North 
America, Inc., 29 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 1994), and hence 
recommended that Boury's motion be granted. After a de 
novo review of the pleadings and evidence, the district court 
adopted the magistrate judge's report and granted 
summary judgment to Boury. On appeal, Knabe contends 
that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude 
summary judgment in Boury's favor. The standards for 
summary judgment and our standard of review are well 
known and are set forth in the margin.4  
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
Knabe contends that Humbrecht subjected her to a 
hostile work environment during her two months of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c). Upon a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party, 
to prevail, must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 
[every] element essential to that party's case, and on which that party 
will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322 (1986). In evaluating whether the non-moving party has 
established each necessary element, we must grant all reasonable 
inferences from the evidence to the non-moving party. See Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). "Where the 
record taken as a whole could not lead a reasonable trier of fact to find 
for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.' " Id. at 
587. Our review on appeal is plenary. The district court exercised 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a), and we have appellate 
jurisdiction over the final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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employment at the Monroeville Elby's. See Meritor Sav. 
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) ("[A] plaintiff may 
establish a violation of Title VII by proving that 
discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or 
abusive work environment.") We have held that, to bring a 
claim for sexual harassment under Title VII because of an 
intimidating and offensive work environment, a plaintiff 
must establish " `by the totality of the circumstances, the 
existence of a hostile or abusive working environment 
which is severe enough to affect the psychological stability 
of a minority employee.' " Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482 
(quoting Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 
1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989)). Even if a work environment 
is found to be hostile, a plaintiff must also show that the 
conduct creating the hostile work environment should be 
imputed to the employer. 
 
In Andrews, we set forth the five factors that a plaintiff 
must establish to bring a successful hostile work 
environment claim against his or her employer: (1) the 
employee suffered intentional discrimination because of his 
or her sex; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; 
(3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) 
the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable 
person of the same sex in that position; and (5) respondeat 
superior liability existed. Id.; see also Spain v. Gallegos, 26 
F.3d 439, 447 (3d Cir. 1994).5 
 
The crucial question here is the fifth factor: whether 
Boury can be held liable for Humbrecht's actions.6 In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Employer liability under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act 
follows the standards set out for employer liability under Title VII. See 
Hoy v. Angelone, 691 A.2d 476 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); see also West v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744 (3d Cir. 1995) (utilizing Title VII 
standards in case involving PHRA hostile work environment claim). 
 
6. The district court concluded that Knabe has established a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Humbrecht created a hostile work 
environment. Boury contends that, even if we conclude that Knabe has 
presented a genuine issue of material fact on the question whether 
Boury can be held liable for Humbrecht's alleged actions, we should 
affirm the summary judgment on the ground that Knabe had not 
presented sufficient evidence to establish the existence of pervasive and 
severe harassment. Because of our disposition of this appeal, we need 
not reach that question. 
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Vinson, supra, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that 
employers are strictly liable for sexually hostile work 
environments created by employees. Rather, drawing from 
the fact that an "agent" of an employer is included in the 
definition of employer in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), the 
Court directed that agency principles be used as guidance 
in determining employer liability for hostile work 
environments created by employees. 477 U.S. at 72. We 
elaborated on those agency principles in Bouton v. BMW of 
North America, Inc., 29 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
We made clear in Bouton that the liability of an employer 
is not automatic even if the sexually hostile work 
environment is created by a supervisory employee.7 We 
recognized three potential bases in the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency for holding employers liable for 
harassment committed by their employees. First, under 
§ 219(1), employers are liable for the torts committed by 
employees within the scope of their employment. We noted 
in Bouton that, while such scope-of-employment liability is 
often invoked in quid pro quo cases because a supervisor 
has used his or her actual authority over the employee to 
gain sexual favors, this liability is inapposite in hostile 
environment cases: "[I]n a hostile environment case, the 
harasser is not explicitly raising the mantle of authority to 
cloak the plaintiff in an unwelcome atmosphere." Bouton, 
29 F.3d at 107. 
 
Agency law provides two other theories through which a 
plaintiff can hold an employer liable for sexual harassment, 
which are more appropriate in a sexually hostile work 
environment case like Knabe's. Under Restatement 
§ 219(2)(b), employers are liable for their own negligence or 
recklessness: in this context, an employer is liable for 
"negligent failure to discipline or fire, or failure to take 
remedial action upon notice of harassment." Bouton, 29 
F.3d at 106. And under § 219(2)(d), employers are liable if 
the harassing employee "relied upon apparent authority or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Knabe, therefore, incorrectly asserts that respondeat superior liability 
automatically attaches to the employer when a supervisor, who has the 
authority to hire, fire, and discipline the victim of the harassment, 
creates the hostile work environment. 
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was aided by the agency relationship." Id. Knabe relies on 
the former principle in contending that Boury is liable for 
the hostile work environment created by Humbrecht. 
 
B. 
 
Knabe submits that there is a genuine issue of material 
fact whether Boury was negligent or reckless in responding 
to her complaint that Humbrecht harassed her. We have 
explained that an employer is liable for an employee's 
behavior under a negligence theory of agency "if a plaintiff 
proves that management-level employees had actual or 
constructive knowledge about the existence of a sexually 
hostile work environment and failed to take prompt and 
adequate remedial action." Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1486; 
Bouton, 29 F.3d at 107 ("[U]nder negligence principles, 
prompt and effective action by the employer will relieve it of 
liability.").8 Knabe concedes that Boury cannot be charged 
with knowledge of Humbrecht's activities until October 20, 
1993, when Knabe complained to Barnes. Thus the 
question here is whether Boury took prompt and adequate 
action after receiving notice of Humbrecht's alleged actions 
on October 20, 1993. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Our holding in Bouton that prompt and effective remedial action by an 
employer will relieve it of liability under a negligence theory of agency, 29 
F.3d at 107, does not alter our holding in Andrews that an employer's 
failure to take prompt and adequate remedial action may expose it to 
such liability, 895 F.2d at 1486. As we will discuss in the text, a 
remedial action is adequate if it is reasonably calculated to prevent 
further harassment. In Bouton, the remedial action was deemed 
adequate under the Andrews test because it was effective. This makes 
sense. A remedial action that effectively stops the harassment will be 
deemed adequate as a matter of law. On the other hand, it is possible 
that an action that proves to be ineffective in stopping the harassment 
may nevertheless be found reasonably calculated to prevent future 
harassment and therefore adequate. Thus, where an employer's prompt 
remedial action is not effective (or, as in this case, where the 
effectiveness of the prompt remedial action cannot be tested), courts may 
still decide that the action was adequate as a matter of law. Hence, 
though Knabe's decision to quit prevents us from determining whether 
Boury's remedial action was effective, the question before us is whether 
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether that action was 
adequate. 
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Knabe does not challenge the district court's conclusion 
that Boury's response to her complaint was prompt. 
Rather, she focuses on the requirement that a remedial 
action must be adequate, and she contends that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding the adequacy of 
Boury's actions. According to Knabe, Barnes' investigation 
was so flawed that it could not have produced an adequate 
remedial action. To support this claim, she has presented 
several pieces of evidence that Barnes' investigation had 
significant flaws. 
 
First, she points to certain aspects of Barnes' deposition 
testimony. Barnes testified that she believed she could not 
make a finding that an employee had engaged in sexual 
harassment without a witness who could corroborate the 
complainant's allegations. Accordingly, she believed that 
she could not reprimand Humbrecht because there were no 
witnesses to the alleged harassment. In related testimony, 
Barnes also stated that she did not take Knabe's credibility 
into account in investigating the claim. In short, Knabe 
submits, Barnes would not have reprimanded Humbrecht 
because there were no witnesses to the harassment even if 
she found Knabe's complaint to be fully credible. 
 
Knabe also points to Barnes' records of conversation, 
which show that Barnes questioned Humbrecht only about 
the October 13 incident and not about the other alleged 
instances of harassment. Similarly, she asked the three 
employees whom she interviewed whether they had ever 
observed any manager at the restaurant make any 
improper advances or comments, without referencing 
Knabe's specific allegations. Moreover, she failed to 
interview the employees who witnessed the bathroom 
incident. Knabe contends that, because of these 
circumstances, Barnes' investigation failed to turn up 
information that was vital to determining whether 
Humbrecht had harassed her. According to Knabe, the 
resulting response by Boury was ineluctably inadequate, 
and she would have returned to an unabated hostile work 
environment. Based on this evidence, Knabe contends that 
the investigation was so poorly run that there is a genuine 
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issue of material fact as to whether the remedial action 
taken was adequate.9 
 
We disagree. The question before us is not whether the 
investigation was adequate -- it appears not to have been 
-- but rather whether the remedial action was adequate. 
Even if a company's investigation into complaints of sexual 
harassment is lacking, the employer cannot be held liable 
for the hostile work environment created by an employee 
under a negligence theory of liability unless the remedial 
action taken subsequent to the investigation is also lacking.10 
In other words, the law does not require that investigations 
into sexual harassment complaints be perfect. Rather, to 
determine whether the remedial action was adequate, we 
must consider whether the action was "reasonably 
calculated to prevent further harassment." See, e.g., Saxton 
v. AT&T Co., 10 F.3d 526, 535 (7th Cir. 1993); Ellison v. 
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 1991); Katz v. Dole, 709 
F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983). 
 
It is clear to us that the action taken here was reasonably 
calculated to stop Humbrecht's harassment, even viewing 
the facts in the light most favorable to Knabe. Although 
Barnes testified that she was unable to make afinding that 
harassment occurred or to subject Humbrecht to 
disciplinary measures without a corroborating witness (an 
incorrect premise), she nevertheless took remedial action.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Knabe also points to evidence that Humbrecht had been transferred to 
the Monroeville restaurant because he had engaged in a consensual 
affair with an employee he supervised at another restaurant. See supra 
n.3. She contends that Barnes' failure to take this information into 
account in assessing whether Humbrecht harassed Knabe constituted 
another serious flaw in Barnes' investigation. This contention, however, 
is based on speculation that Humbrecht had also harassed the employee 
at his prior post, and Knabe has presented no evidence of prior sexual 
harassment claims lodged against Humbrecht. The evidence regarding 
Humbrecht's transfer to the Monroeville restaurant is, therefore, 
irrelevant. 
 
10. That said, employers would be well advised to establish protocols to 
ensure careful and complete investigation of sexual harassment 
complaints. 
 
11. Of course, we do not imply that the presence of a corroborating 
witness may not be important to an employer in determining that 
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The record of the conversation between Barnes and 
Humbrecht on October 25, which was signed by both 
Barnes and Humbrecht, reflects that Barnes warned 
Humbrecht that the "company does not tolerate any sexual 
comments or actions. Any company violations of this policy 
will receive possible suspension and/or termination." 
Moreover, Humbrecht was directed to restore Knabe to the 
schedule immediately. The record of the conversation 
between Barnes and Knabe the next day, which was signed 
by Knabe and Barnes, demonstrates that Knabe was 
informed that she should contact the company at any time 
regarding any improper language or sexual advances. 
Barnes also provided Knabe with the names and phone 
numbers of four members of Boury management, including 
herself, whom Knabe could contact with any future 
complaints. 
 
Even though the company did not reprimand Humbrecht, 
as it well might have, we find this remedial action adequate 
as a matter of law because it was reasonably calculated to 
prevent further harassment. As a result of the two meetings 
with Barnes, Humbrecht was made aware of his 
responsibilities, and Knabe was made aware of her rights in 
case of future improper conduct. Knabe has presented no 
evidence that there would have been a hostile work 
environment had she returned or that Humbrecht would 
have felt free to continue his harassment upon her return 
to work. See Ryczek v. Guest Servs. Inc., 877 F. Supp. 754, 
759 (D.D.C. 1995) ("Even if the investigation was not 
handled perfectly, the plaintiff has presented no evidence to 
suggest that Guest Services did anything that would have 
allowed any harassment to continue."); cf. Konstantopoulos 
v. Westvaco Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 1997 WL 222821 (3d Cir. 
1997) (rejecting a per se rule that requiring an employee to 
work in close proximity to co-workers responsible for prior 
harassment constitutes hostile work environment). 
 
Moreover, Knabe has presented no evidence that, if a 
proper investigation had been performed, Barnes' response 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
remedial action is necessary. Rather, we point out that an employer can 
decide that a complaint is justified even if uncorroborated. On the other 
hand, an employer need not credit a complaint simply because an 
employee makes it. 
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would have been different -- namely, she has not shown 
that Humbrecht would have been reprimanded, suspended, 
or fired. Under these circumstances, even assuming that 
Barnes should have credited Knabe's allegations and 
concluded that Humbrecht harassed her, Knabe has not 
established any genuine issues of material fact as to the 
adequacy of Boury's response to her complaint. 
 
We also reject Knabe's contention that there is a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether any remedial action 
was taken. According to Knabe, it is unclear from the 
record whether Barnes actually "warned" Humbrecht not to 
engage in further harassment. If Humbrecht was not given 
a warning, the argument continues, then he was completely 
exonerated and no remedial action was taken. See Fuller v. 
City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1529 (9th Cir. 1995) ("An 
employer whose sole action is to conclude that no 
harassment occurred cannot in any meaningful sense be 
said to have `remedied' what happened. Denial does not 
constitute a remedy. Nor does the fact of investigation alone 
suffice; an investigation is principally a way to determine 
whether any remedy is needed and cannot substitute for 
the remedy itself."). 
 
In our view, the evidence presented by Knabe points only 
to the conclusion that remedial action was taken by Boury. 
Barnes' record of the conversation between her and 
Humbrecht reports that the company policies respecting 
sexual harassment were "discussed." While Barnes herself 
did not choose the word "warn," we think that informing 
Humbrecht that "any company violations of this policy will 
receive possible suspension and/or termination" was clearly 
a warning and that no reasonable jury would find in 
Knabe's favor as to whether the company actually took 
remedial action. 
 
In reaching these conclusions, we make several 
observations. Although we determine that Boury's remedial 
action was adequate in spite of Barnes' flawed 
investigation, it is also clear that there may be cases in 
which an employer's investigation is so flawed that it could 
not be said that the remedial action was adequate. For 
example, the investigation might be carried out in a way 
that prevents the discovery of serious and significant 
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harassment by an employee such that the remedy chosen 
by the employer could not be held to be reasonably 
calculated to prevent the harassment. An investigation 
must be undertaken, see Swentek v. USAir, 830 F.2d 552, 
558 (4th Cir. 1987) ("In taking remedial action, USAir was 
obliged to investigate Swentek's charges and to present a 
reasonable basis for its subsequent actions."), and an 
employer can be held liable if a faulty investigation renders 
its subsequent remedial action inadequate, i.e., not 
reasonably calculated to prevent further harassment. 
 
Knabe objects to the remedial action selected by Boury, 
and approved by us here, on the ground that Humbrecht 
should have been transferred from the restaurant orfired. 
We conclude that, if the remedy chosen by the employer is 
adequate, an aggrieved employee cannot object to that 
selected action. Concomitantly, an employee cannot dictate 
that the employer select a certain remedial action. We agree 
with the Seventh Circuit that: "No doubt, from [the 
plaintiff's] perspective, [the defendant] could have done 
more to remedy the adverse effects of [the employee's] 
conduct. But Title VII requires only that the employer take 
steps reasonably likely to stop the harassment." Saxton, 10 
F.3d at 535-36. 
 
From this holding it also follows that taking punitive 
action against the harassing employee, e.g., reprimand, 
suspension or dismissal, is not necessary to insulate the 
employer from liability for a hostile work environment.12 So 
long as the remedy is reasonably calculated to prevent 
future instances of harassment, the company cannot be 
held liable under a negligence theory of agency. Ryczek, 
877 F. Supp. at 760 ("[A]n employer, in order to avoid 
liability for the discriminatory conduct of an employee, does 
not have to necessarily discipline or terminate the offending 
employee as long as the employer takes corrective action 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. In fact, an employer might be faced with a lawsuit filed by the 
employee allegedly responsible for the harassment if the employer takes 
punitive action without ensuring that adequate grounds exist for the 
action. See, e.g., Hope A. Comisky, "Prompt and Effective Remedial 
Action?" What Must an Employer Do to Avoid Liability for "Hostile Work 
Environmental" Sexual Harassment?, 8 Lab. Law. 181, 195 (1992). 
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reasonably likely to prevent the offending conduct from 
reoccurring." (citation omitted)). 
 
We do not, of course, suggest that nonpunitive action will 
be an adequate remedy in all cases.13 Whether a 
nonpunitive remedy is reasonably calculated to end the 
harassment is, to a certain extent, a function of the severity 
and frequency of the harassment, and is a highly fact- 
specific inquiry. The more severe and more frequent the 
harassment, the less likely a nonpunitive remedy will be 
found adequate. But where, as here, the plaintiff has 
presented no evidence that a nonpunitive remedial action 
was not reasonably calculated to end the harassment, 
summary judgment for an employer is appropriate. 
 
Knabe also contends that the effect of the district court's 
judgment is that a complainant must return to work after 
the remedial action in order to present evidence sufficient 
to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the 
adequacy of the remedy. According to Knabe, the district 
court's holding implied that she could have withstood 
summary judgment only by presenting evidence that she 
faced a sexually hostile work environment when she 
returned to the workplace. We disagree. Knabe must only 
present enough evidence to show, taking that evidence as 
true, that the remedial action was not "reasonably 
calculated" to prevent further acts of harassment, and even 
a plaintiff who fails to return to work because of 
dissatisfaction with the remedial action chosen by the 
employer can make this showing. 
 
The question whether a chosen remedy was reasonably 
calculated to prevent further acts of harassment can be 
answered at the time that remedy is put into place. While 
evidence that an employee returned to a hostile 
environment after the remedial action is certainly helpful to 
a plaintiff's case, it is not necessary for resolving whether, 
at the time it was carried out, the employer's response was 
reasonably calculated to end the harassment. Moreover, the 
rule that a plaintiff must show that the remedy was not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Indeed, Boury's own counsel conceded at oral argument that a 
warning would not be an adequate remedy in a situation in which an 
employee alleged that she was raped by another employee. 
 
                                15 
reasonably calculated to prevent further acts of harassment 
prevents a different, but no less unfortunate, result: it 
makes clear that a plaintiff cannot survive summary 
judgment merely by failing to return to his or her job after 
the remedial action at issue is taken.14  
 
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Knabe also relies on language in Bouton  that "an effective grievance 
procedure--one that is known to the victim and that timely stops the 
harassment--shields that employer from Title VII liability for a hostile 
environment." 29 F.3d at 110. Based on this language, she contends 
that, because there is an issue of fact as to whether Knabe knew about 
the grievance procedure, see supra p. 5, she has presented sufficient 
evidence to withstand summary judgment with respect to whether Boury 
was negligent in carrying out the remedial action. We disagree. While 
employers would be well advised to ensure clear and permanent notice 
of its sexual harassment policy and grievance procedure, the language 
from Bouton suggests only one way in which an employer can escape 
negligence liability for a sexually hostile work environment created by an 
employee. So long as the remedial action taken is prompt and adequate, 
it is not necessary that the plaintiff have previous knowledge of a sexual 
harassment grievance procedure for the employer to be entitled to 
summary judgment. 
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